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How Japanese Subsidiaries in Asia
Responded to the Regional Crisis
An Empirical Analysis Based
on the MITI Survey
Kyoji Fukao
8.1 Introduction
Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries play an important role in Asian
economies. Especially in relatively advanced industries, such as electrical
machinery and transport equipment, Japanese subsidiaries sometimes
employ more than one-third of the total workforce employed in these in-
dustries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-4) coun-
tries (table 8.1). Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) has provided
Asian countries not only with production technology and managerial
know-how but also with stable capital inﬂows. Therefore, the behavior of
Japanese subsidiaries in Asia and the associated consequences for ﬂows
of FDI are bound to play a crucial role in shaping the regional recovery
process.
Because foreign subsidiaries can rely on their parent ﬁrms’ support,
their operations are likely to be less inﬂuenced by the crisis. Moreover,
sharp currency devaluations potentially increase aﬀected Asian countries’
attractiveness to foreign ﬁrms by reducing production costs.1 However, as
of date there is little evidence to prove such optimistic expectations be-
Kyoji Fukao is professor of economics at the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsu-
bashi University.
This research was conducted as part of the project titled “The Currency and Economic
Crisis in Asia” sponsored by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI).
1. UNCTAD (1998) stressed the importance of this mechanism. Blomstro ¨m and Lipsey
(1993) found that in Latin America after the debt crisis in the 1980s, foreign subsidiaries







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.cause few empirical studies on foreign subsidiaries’ responses to the recent
ﬁnancial crisis in Asia have been carried out.2
Using subsidiary level data from the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) 1996 and 1997, I analyze the response of Ja-
pan’s manufacturing subsidiaries in the ASEAN-4 countries and Korea to
the recent Asian ﬁnancial crises, which started in the second half of 1997.3
Because about 90 percent of workers employed by Japanese subsidiaries
in this region are employed by manufacturing subsidiaries, I concentrate
on manufacturing subsidiaries in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 8.2 I provide a general
overview of the performance of Japan’s manufacturing subsidiaries after
the crisis. In section 8.3, I study recent trends of Japan’s FDI ﬂows to
ASEAN-4 countries and Korea. In section 8.4, using microdata of MITI
surveys, I compare subsidiaries’ performances and responses across indus-
tries and host countries. By subdividing subsidiaries into two groups, I
also study how diﬀerent characteristics of subsidiaries aﬀected their per-
formance and response. In section 8.5, I undertake an econometric investi-
gation of Japanese subsidiaries’ response using microdata from MITI
surveys.
8.2 An Overview of the Performance of Japan’s
Asian Subsidiaries after the Crisis
The currency crisis had both positive and negative impacts on multi-
national enterprises’ activities in this region. On the one hand, export-
oriented subsidiaries may have beneﬁted from the reduction of production
costs caused by the sharp currency depreciation. On the other hand, local
market–oriented subsidiaries were seriously hit by the decline of local de-
mand and price increases of imported intermediate inputs.
Another consequence of host country currency depreciation are capital
losses, which, indeed, a majority of Japanese subsidiaries in this region
suﬀered. An amazingly high percentage of Japanese subsidiaries in this
region had not hedged the exchange risk originating from their liabilities
2. Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (1998), Lamberte et al. (1999), and OECF and RIDA
(1999) found that both in Thailand and in the Philippines ﬁrms with foreign ties performed
better than independent local ﬁrms after the crisis. There are several reports, written in Japa-
nese, on Japanese subsidiaries’ response to the crisis. Among them, JETRO (1999), MITI
(1999a,c), Research Institute of International Investment and Development (1999), and Tou-
you Keizai Sinpou-sha (1999) are informative. Ramstetter (1999) also studies FDI ﬂows in
Thailand after the crisis. However, neither Ramstetter nor any of the Japanese studies men-
tioned here use detailed subsidiary-level data. Until the U.S. Department of Commerce pub-
lishes U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1998 I cannot get detailed information on U.S. subsidi-
aries’ 1998 activities in Asia.
3. The 1997 survey accounts for operations during the ﬁscal year through March 1998.
Japanese Subsidiaries in Asia and the Regional Crisis 269being denominated mainly in foreign currencies, including yen.4 According
to the MITI’s Comparative Survey of Economic Structure (Keizai Kouzou
Hikaku Chousa), conducted in December 1998 and January 1999, 50 per-
cent of Japan’s manufacturing subsidiaries in the ASEAN-4 countries and
Korea had not hedged their exchange risk before the crisis. An additional
32 percent had insuﬃciently hedged the risk. It seems that they had ig-
nored the exchange risk partly because of relatively stable exchange rates
in the region—with the exception of Indonesia and the Philippines—over
the past decades.
Critical situations in both the host countries’ and the Japanese banking
systems may also have had a negative eﬀect on Japanese subsidiaries in
this region. Because Japan’s foreign subsidiaries borrow primarily from
Japanese banks, it seems that the lending behaviors of Japanese banks and
their ﬁnancial subsidiaries abroad have more signiﬁcant eﬀects on Japan’s
nonﬁnancial subsidiaries in Asia than do the lending behaviors of local
banks. According to MITI (1998), at the end of ﬁscal 1995, 64 percent of
the total stock of long-term bank loans locally raised by Japan’s manufac-
turing subsidiaries in the ASEAN-4 countries came from local subsidiaries
of Japanese banks. Reﬂecting the ﬁnancial turmoil and the declining de-
mand for new loans, almost all of Japan’s private banks have been reduc-
ing their total lending. For example, from ﬁscal 1996 to 1997, the Indus-
trial Bank of Japan, the Mitsubishi Bank, and the Sakura Bank reduced
their total lending by 6.0, 3.0, and 4.8 percent, respectively. In statistics
provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), it is reported
that Japanese banks reduced their cross-border lending to East Asia by
almost 20 percent in the year from June 1997 to June 1998.
Despite the reduction of loans, the majority of Japan’s manufacturing
subsidiaries in this region registered no complaints about the credit
crunch. According to MITI (1998–99), only 28 percent replied that they
have faced some diﬃculties in continuing their borrowing or in getting
new loans. Two factors may have mitigated the negative impact of credit
contraction. First, since the liberalization of Japan’s ﬁnancial markets in
the mid-1980s, large manufacturing ﬁrms have increased their direct ﬁ-
nancing from ﬁnancial markets and have become more independent from
banks.5 Second, to counter the credit crunch, the Japanese government has
let state-owned banks expand their lending. From ﬁscal 1996 to 1997 the
Export-Import Bank of Japan and the Japan Development Bank increased
their total lending by 8.9 and 2.5 percent, respectively. Today, quite a num-
ber of Japanese parent ﬁrms have state-owned banks as their prime lend-
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4. For example, Asian subsidiaries of Toray Industries incurred a capital loss of 11 billion
yen in ﬁscal 1997, which is almost equal to its average annual operating proﬁt in the region
(Japan Economic Research Institute 1999).
5. However, smaller ﬁrms, which still depend on their main banks, might have been
aﬀected by the credit crunch.ers. At the end of ﬁscal 1997, the Export-Import Bank of Japan was the
prime lender for Nissan Motor, Honda Motor, Fujitsu, and major general
trading companies, such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Marubeni.
To analyze recent trends in production activity by Japan’s manufactur-
ing subsidiaries abroad, MITI’s Survey of Trends of Enterprises (Kigyou
Doukou Chousa), which is conducted on a quarterly basis, is probably the
best source.
Panel A of ﬁgure 8.1 shows the change in sales (in yen) of Japan’s manu-
facturing subsidiaries in the ASEAN-4 countries by industry. Subsidiar-
ies in the transport equipment industry, the majority of which are local
market–oriented, faced a sharp decline in total sales. According to MITI
(1998), Japanese subsidiaries in the transport equipment industry in the
ASEAN-4 countries sold 91.9 percent of their total sales in their host
country and exported 2.5 percent to Japan, 0.9 percent to other Asian
countries, and 4.7 percent outside the region in ﬁscal 1995. In the case of
subsidiaries in the electrical machinery industry, the majority of which
are export oriented, the decline in total sales was much smaller. Japanese
subsidiaries in this industry in the ASEAN-4 countries sold 29.4 percent
of their total sales in their host country and exported 36.2 percent to Ja-
pan, 20.3 percent to other Asian countries, and 14.1 percent outside the
region in ﬁscal 1995.
Panel B of ﬁgure 8.1 shows changes in employment by industry. Basi-
cally, employment trends correspond to those in sales. However, compared
to sales, the reduction in employment is moderate. It is interesting that
although sales of subsidiaries in the transport equipment industry have
dropped more sharply than have sales of subsidiaries in the textiles and
garments industry, reductions in employment in the two industries were
almost of the same magnitude.
8.3 FDI Flows to Asia after the Crisis
Despite the sharp decline in sales and proﬁts in the region, Japan’s FDI
ﬂows (on the basis of balance of payment statistics) to this region have
increased after the crisis (table 8.2). From the period of July 1996 to June
1997 to the period of July 1997 to June 1998, Japan’s FDI ﬂows to the ﬁve
countries under consideration increased by 49 percent.
According to the standard theory of FDI (Caves 1982; Dunning 1993),
it is not surprising to observe increases in FDI inﬂows to the Asian coun-
tries hit by the ﬁnancial crisis. FDI ﬂows involve not only ﬁnancial capital
but also parent ﬁrms’ intangible assets, such as the stock of technological
knowledge, marketing know-how, and goodwill, on which stable supplier
systems are based. Real capital, human resources, location, and other ele-
ments of subsidiaries are designed and organized to derive maximum re-
turns from such intangible assets. Large transaction costs are associated




























































































































































































.Bwith the transfer of intangible assets among ﬁrms by arm’s-length trans-
actions. It is also costly to adjust the structure of a subsidiary to another
ﬁrm’s intangible assets. Thus, the resale price of a subsidiary might be
much lower than the initial investment. This means that FDI is accompa-
nied by sunk costs. If substantial sunk costs are involved, a parent ﬁrm
will support its subsidiary under adversary conditions. It is also true that
if there is substantial accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, ﬁrms will not
drastically cut their employment when their sales decline.6
It is sometimes argued that a particular feature of the Japanese produc-
tion system is a heavy reliance on long-term supplier relationships and the
accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills. If this argument is correct, we would
expect Japanese parent ﬁrms to invest more actively in order to support
troubled subsidiaries than do parent ﬁrms from other countries. We should
also note that if this sunk cost hypothesis is correct, Japanese ﬁrms will not
easily start new investment projects unless they expect substantial proﬁts.
There are at least two other possible explanations for the increase in
FDI inﬂows to Asia after the crisis. First, currency depreciation and the
fall in asset prices in the Asian countries created a kind of a ﬁre-sale situa-
tion for foreign ﬁrms. If foreign ﬁrms expect the Asian countries to recover
in the near future, they would not want to miss the bargain. Second, the
sharp currency depreciation has potentially increased aﬀected Asian coun-
tries’ attractiveness to foreign ﬁrms by reducing production costs. Foreign
ﬁrms may therefore consider either establishing new export bases through
6. For a more rigorous theoretical analysis on this issue, see Fukao and Otaki (1993) and
Hamermesh (1993).
Table 8.2 Japan’s Direct Investment Abroad, Capital Outﬂows on a BOP Statistics Basis (in
billions of yen)
1995 1996 1997 1998
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st
half half half half half half half
K o r e a 1 91 42 61 81 2 85 3
Thailand 41 47 65 81 91 156 146
I n d o n e s i a 3 25 87 39 09 89 19 3
Malaysia 11 24 31 26 51 69 48
The Philippines 29 72 41 11 16 26 43
Five countries 132 215 236 224 268 351 382
Asia 322 478 535 525 717 870 659
North America 571 302 561 687 489 447 465
Europe 79 237 162 146 215 87 204
All countries 1,049 1,080 1,275 1,273 1,609 1,536 1,835
Source: Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments (BOP) Monthly, various issues.
274 Kyoji Fukaogreenﬁeld investments or expanding the production capacity of existing
export-oriented subsidiaries in order to exploit the decline in production
costs.7
These two explanations, however, are in contradiction with several sta-
tistics. According to MITI (1999b), Japan’s manufacturing subsidiaries in
the ASEAN-4 countries have reduced their investments in tangible ﬁxed
assets (excluding land) by 54 percent from the third quarter of 1997 to the
third quarter of 1998. Even subsidiaries in the electrical machinery indus-
try, which are the most export oriented and the least hit by the crisis, re-
duced their investment by 25 percent during this period. According to our
data set, average employment in existing subsidiaries in the ﬁve countries
declined by 5 percent from March 1997 to March 1998.
As table 8.3 shows, the number of new FDI cases by Japanese ﬁrms to
the ASEAN-4 countries and Korea has declined considerably. It is interest-
ing that although Japanese ﬁrms almost stopped new investments, they
seem to be reluctant to close or sell their existing subsidiaries. Japanese
ﬁrms sold or closed ﬁfty-ﬁve subsidiaries in 1998 (table 8.6), equivalent to
only 1.5 percent of the 3,680 existing subsidiaries in the ﬁve countries.
Compared with U.S. and German ﬁrms, Japanese ﬁrms made a quite
limited amount of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the
ASEAN-4 countries and Korea (table 8.4). U.S. ﬁrms are active in M&A
purchases especially in the ﬁnance and communication service sectors,
in which Japanese ﬁrms do not have a comparative advantage (Nikkei
1999b). Even in the manufacturing sector, however, there were only two
cases of M&A purchases conducted by Japanese ﬁrms in the region in
1998 (table 8.5).
7. Perez-Quiros and Popper (1996) found that FDI is more stable over time compared with
short-term investment. Frankel and Rose (1995) found that the accumulation of inward FDI
reduces the probability that the host country will be hit by a currency crisis. On this issue,
see also Berg and Pattillo (1998).
Table 8.3 The Number of New FDI Cases by Japanese Firms in the ASEAN-4
Countries and Korea, Total Number of Greenﬁeld Investments, M&A
Purchases, and New Capital Participations: All Industries
Korea Thailand Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Total
1991 14 51 47 39 16 167
1992 4 35 39 32 12 122
1993 7 28 18 26 4 83
1994 7 39 30 26 7 109
1995 25 63 47 29 43 207
1996 30 99 72 39 40 280
1997 15 65 27 24 30 161
1998 12 18 9 14 16 69
Source: Author’s calculations based on Touyou Keizai Shinpou-sha (1999).
Japanese Subsidiaries in Asia and the Regional Crisis 275Table 8.4 The Number of Japanese Subsidiaries in the ASEAN-4 Countries and
Korea Which Were Closed or Sold to Local or Other Countries’ Firms:
All Industries
Korea Thailand Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Total
1991 4 1 4 2 2 13
1992 3 2 1 5 2 13
1993 6 3 3 3 0 15
1994 4 5 0 8 0 17
1995 8 3 1 5 0 17
1996 3 5 3 4 2 17
1997 6 8 1 5 3 23
1998 7 20 6 14 8 55
Source: Author’s calculations based on Touyou Keizai Sinpou-sha (1999).
Table 8.5 Cross-Border M&A Purchases in the ASEAN-4 Countries and Korea
by Purchasing Company’s Country of Origin, 1997–98 (in millions of
U.S. dollars)
First Half Second Half First Half
1997 1997 1998a
United States 542 2,066 1,955
Singapore 145 2,001 306
Germany 556 898 872
Japan 648 223 239
Hong Kong 464 180 46
Taiwan 834 274 64
United Kingdom 616 8 252
Source: UNCTAD (1998), original data provided by KPMG Corporate Finance.
aData for the ﬁrst half of 1998 are preliminary.
It is interesting to note that in the case of U.S. ﬁrms, although they
actively increased M&A purchases in the ﬁve countries, their FDI ﬂows
to the ﬁve countries declined considerably in 1997 (table 8.7).8
Putting the above pieces of evidence together, it appears that Japanese
ﬁrms increased their FDI ﬂows to the Asian countries mainly in order
to ﬁnancially assist their subsidiariesthat were suﬀering from deteriorating
ﬁnancial conditions. Compared with U.S. and European ﬁrms, they made
quite limited amounts of cross-border M&A purchases motivated to take
advantage of the currency depreciation and the fall of stock prices. Cases
of the establishment of new export bases through greenﬁeld investments
and capacity expansion of existing export-oriented subsidiaries motivated
to exploit the decline in production cost in the Asian countries were also
rare.
8. I should note that deﬁnitions for FDI ﬂows and M&A purchases diﬀer. For detail on





























































































































































































































































































































.8.4 Detailed Analysis of Japanese Subsidiaries’ Response to the Crisis
From the microdata of MITI’s Survey on Trends of Japan’s Business Ac-
tivities Abroad (Kaigai Jigyoukatudou Doukou Chousa), we can get more
detailed information on activities of Japanese subsidiaries; 2,346 sub-
sidiaries in the ASEAN-4 countries and Korea answered the 1996 MITI
survey. I matched individual manufacturing subsidiary data of the 1996
survey with that of the 1997 survey. I also got additional information on
parent ﬁrms, such as their net proﬁts and total assets, from their ﬁnancial
reports (Japan Ministry of Finance [MOF] 1998). After excluding subsidi-
aries that did not provide answers regarding basic information, such as
sales and employment,9 I obtained panel data of 1,101 manufacturing sub-
sidiaries that employed 712,000 workers in March 1997.10 According to
Touyou Keizai Shinpou-sha (1999), Japan’s manufacturing subsidiaries
were employing 857,000 workers in the ASEAN-4 countries and Korea
(299,000 in Thailand, 200,000 in Indonesia, 62,000 in Korea, 195,000 in
Malaysia, and 101,000 in the Philippines) in October 1998, so our data set
covers a substantial percentage of Japan’s manufacturing activities in these
countries. The data set includes 723 subsidiaries in Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia. Because subsidiaries in these countries were harder hit by the
Asian crisis, I will primarily use the latter subset for the analysis in this
section.
Table 8.8 compares local market–oriented subsidiaries with export-
oriented subsidiaries in Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. In the case of
local market–oriented subsidiaries for which the exports/sales ratio is
9. I have also excluded from the data set subsidiaries suspended before March 1997,
started up after April 1996, and employing fewer than twenty workers in March 1997.
10. The data set includes eighteen subsidiaries closed and ten subsidiaries suspended in
ﬁscal 1998.
Table 8.7 U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, Capital Outﬂows by Country (in
millions of U.S. dollars)
1994 1995 1996 1997
Korea 390 1,051 766 761
Thailand 703 686 501 130
Indonesia 2,061 519 686 560
Malaysia 553 1,037 963 637
The Philippines 414 269 716 291
Five countries 4,121 3,562 3,632 2,119
Asia and Paciﬁc 13,437 14,342 12,190 13,815
Europe 34,380 52,275 35,992 60,558
Western hemisphere 17,710 16,040 16,081 23,784
All countries 73,252 92,074 74,833 114,537












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.smaller than 50 percent, average sales and proﬁts declined substantially.
On average, they also reduced their employment slightly: 79 percent of
local market–oriented subsidiaries employ fewer workers. In contrast with
this, export-oriented subsidiaries were able to increase their sales by 17
percent and almost doubled their proﬁts. However, compared with their
exports before the crisis and with the increase in exports achieved by local
market–oriented subsidiaries, the increase in exports by export-oriented
subsidiaries does not seem spectacular at all. Moreover, although export-
oriented subsidiaries have enjoyed increases in sales and proﬁts, they ap-
pear to have hesitated to expand their production capacity, and their aver-
age workforce increased by less than 1 percent.
Table 8.9 compares the impact of the crisis across industries in Korea,
Thailand, and Indonesia. The table reveals a number of interesting facts.
First, as we have already seen, local market–oriented subsidiaries, such as
those in the chemical and metal products industry, the transport equip-
ment industry, and in what I have labelled low-tech industries (such as
foodstuﬀs, wood products, etc., but excluding textiles and garments), were
hardest hit. It is interesting that the average performance of subsidiaries
in the textiles and garments industry was not very good, although their
average exports/sales ratio was high. We can partly explain this by the
diﬀerence in export destinations. According to MITI (1998), ASEAN-4
subsidiaries in this industry sold 35 percent of their total exports within
Asia excluding Japan, and exported only 22 percent to Japan in ﬁscal
1995. In contrast to this, subsidiaries in the electrical machinery industry
exported 51 percent of their total exports to Japan. Subsidiaries in the
textiles and garments industry might have been hit not only in their local
markets but also in their export markets in Asia.
Second, the elasticity of employment to changes of sales, (employ/
employ)/(sales/sales), is quite diﬀerent between industries. In the case of
the textiles and garments industry, the chemical and metal products indus-
try, and the low-tech industries, the elasticity was greater than one. In the
case of the general machinery and precision instruments industry and the
transport equipment industry, the elasticity was smaller than 0.4. Parent
ﬁrms of subsidiaries in the textiles and garments industry and the low-
tech industries are relatively small and have lower proﬁt rates on the whole.
In contrast, the majority of subsidiaries in the general machinery and pre-
cision instruments industry and the transport equipment industry has
large parent ﬁrms making a substantial proﬁt. Possibly, subsidiaries in the
machinery industry were able to maintain their employment levels because
of support from parent ﬁrms.11
11. According to MITI (1998), 62 percent of parent ﬁrms of subsidiaries in the textiles
and garments and the low-tech industries had paid-in capital of less than one billion yen. In
the case of subsidiaries in the transport equipment industry and the general machinery and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Third, trends in subsidiaries’ exports to Japan are also quite diﬀerent
across industries. Subsidiaries in the transport equipment industry, the
electrical machinery industry, and the chemical and metal products indus-
try have increased their exports to Japan considerably. In contrast, exports
to Japan by subsidiaries in the other industries have declined.
Fourth, subsidiaries in the electrical machinery, the general machinery
and precision instruments industry, and the low-tech industries have re-
duced their imports/total procurement ratio by more than 4 percent.
Economic conditions in the ASEAN-4 countries and Korea did not
deteriorate in the same way. The performance of Japanese subsidiaries
wasalsodiﬀerentacrosstheﬁvehostcountries.Figures8.2and8.3showre-
cent trends in these countries’ real exchange rates and manufacturing pro-
duction indexes. The currency crisis spread from Thailand to the other
ASEAN-4 countries very quickly in July 1997, whereas the Korean won
started depreciating four months later. The sharp decline in production in
Thailand preceded the recession in the other four countries. In the case of
the Philippines, the impact of currency depreciation on the macroeconomy
was relatively moderate in 1997.
Our data set covers subsidiaries’ activities of ﬁscal 1996 and 1997.
Therefore, the selected indicators for the subsidiaries in the diﬀerent coun-
tries shown in table 8.10 correspond to macroeconomic trends before
March 1998. According to table 8.10, subsidiaries in Thailand have experi-
enced the sharpest decline in sales and proﬁts. Here, 71 percent of all sub-
sidiaries registered a decline in proﬁts. However, subsidiaries in Thai-
land did not reduce their employment substantially. Subsidiaries in Korea,
in contrast, reduced their employment levels considerably while experienc-
ing modest declines in sales and proﬁts. One possible explanation for this
diﬀerence runs as follows. Japanese subsidiaries in Thailand are generally
younger than subsidiaries in Korea.12 Younger subsidiaries tend to be
equipped with more advanced machinery. Changes in economic conditions
in host countries also sometimes make locational advantages of old subsid-
iaries obsolete, so subsidiaries in Thailand may have been better posi-
tioned than subsidiaries in Korea. Many Japanese parents seem eager to
support their subsidiaries in Thailand. In the case of Thailand, the per-
centage of subsidiaries in which Japan’s capital participation rate in-
creased amounted to 14.7 percent, which was the highest among the ﬁve
countries.
It is also interesting that subsidiaries in Thailand actively increased their
exports to Japan. According to table 8.10, Japanese manufacturing subsid-
iaries in Thailand increased their exports to Japan by 85 billion yen (371
12. In my data set, the majority of Japan’s manufacturing subsidiaries in Korea were estab-
lished before 1987. In the case of Thailand, about three-fourths of manufacturing subsidiar-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.million yen times 228 subsidiaries). This is a considerable amount com-
pared to the current account deﬁcit of Thailand, which stood at $3 billion
in 1997. Even under the serious economic conditions in Thailand, export-
oriented subsidiaries were better oﬀ. According to my data set, subsidiar-
ies with exports/sales ratios exceeding 50 percent increased their average
sales by 20 percent and saw their proﬁts rise by 66 percent. However, they
increased their workforce by only 2 percent.
Although their average sales have increased, subsidiaries in Indonesia
and Malaysia experienced a decline in proﬁts and cut their workforce sub-
stantially. Among the ﬁve countries, only subsidiaries in the Philippines
increased their average workforce. Seventy-ﬁve percent of subsidiaries in
the Philippines were employing more workers in March 1998 than in
March 1997. They also increased their average exports to Japan by 65
percent.
Subdividing Japan’s manufacturing subsidiaries in Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia into two groups, tables 8.11 through 8.14 show how several
characteristics of subsidiaries aﬀected their performance and response.
Subsidiaries majority-owned by Japanese ﬁrms were generally more ex-
port oriented than were minority-owned ones (table 8.11). There is a 19
percent gap in the average exports/sales ratio between the two groups.
Many developing countries have linked export performance requirements
with restrictions on capital participation rates for foreign investors. Local
market–oriented foreign subsidiaries are usually required to be joint ven-
tures with a local partner as the majority owner. According to the Japan
Machinery Center for Trade and Investment (1997), many Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Asia reported that they are restricted by such linkage policies.
Because of their local market–oriented characteristics, minority-owned
subsidiaries were more severely hit by the crisis. After the crisis, all the ﬁve
countries relaxed their regulations on capital participation rates for foreign
ﬁrms (Japan External Trade Organization [JETRO] 1999). Such policy
changes certainly contributed to the substantial increase in Japan’s capital
participation rate, especially in the case of minority-owned subsidiaries.
In the case of minority-owned subsidiaries, 17 percent of all subsidiaries
experienced an increase in the Japanese capital participation rate.
In table 8.12, subsidiaries are subdivided by value added per worker.
This shows that the decline in sales was more moderate in the case of
subsidiaries with a value added per worker of less than 1.5 million yen.
This is probably due to the fact that these subsidiaries were more export
oriented. Moreover, despite the stable trend in sales, these subsidiaries
reduced their employment more substantially. One possible explanation is
that subsidiaries with a high value added per worker are reluctant to lay oﬀ
workers because these have accumulated considerable ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills.
Table 8.13 shows that subsidiaries owned by larger parents were hit
harder, but these subsidiaries expanded their exports to Japan greatly.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.was able to switch from local sales to exports.13 An increase in the Japanese
capital participation rate has also been more common in this group of sub-
sidiaries.
8.5 Econometric Analysis of Subsidiaries’ Responses to the Crisis
Because Japanese subsidiaries seem to be characterized not by nimble-
ness but by perseverance, we study which types of subsidiaries are reluc-
tant to cut their workers when their sales are declining. As we have seen
in table 8.9, the elasticity of employment to changes in sales, (employ/
employ)/(sales/sales), is quite diﬀerent across industries. Using the micro-
data for Japanese subsidiaries in the ASEAN-4 and Korea, as I explained
in the previous section, I estimate determinants of subsidiaries’ elasticities
of employment to a negative change in sales.
In order to estimate determinants of subsidiaries’ elasticities of employ-
ment to a negative change in sales, I use the following model:
(1) GEMP SIGNGSAL GSAL CHAR
SIGNGSAL GSAL EXCH
ii i i
ii i i u
=+ ∗ + +







where i is the index for subsidiaries; GEMP is the growth rate of employ-
ment from March 1997 to March 1998; GSAL is the growth rate of sales
from ﬁscal 1996 to ﬁscal 1997; SIGNGSAL is a dummy variable which
takes the value 1 if and only if GSAL 	 0; CHAR denotes a certain char-
acteristic that might aﬀect the elasticity; EXCH is the depreciation rate of
the host country’s currency against the U.S. dollar from ﬁscal 1996 to ﬁscal
1997 (comparison between two annual averages);14 and u is the usual er-
ror term.
As CHAR, I tried the following six variables.
13. According to Nikkei (1999a) and a personal interview, both Toyota Motor Co. and
Nissan Motor Co. started exports of their Thai-made pickup trucks “Hilux” and “Dutsan”
to Australia, after the crisis, in order to support their Thai subsidiaries. Toyota also increased
exports of its Thai-made diesel engine to Japan. We should note that not all the Japanese
subsidiaries in the region have easily expanded their exports. For example, in contrast with
the case of Thailand, Japanese automobile companies could not substantially increase ex-
ports from their Indonesian subsidiaries because of two problems (Fujimoto and Sugiyama
1999). First, since their Indonesian models have low local content compared to their Thai
and Malaysian counterparts, improvements of price competitiveness by Indonesian currency
depreciation were limited. Second, designs of their Indonesian models, which are mainly van-
or minibus-type commercial vehicles, were too adapted to the Indonesian market for export
to other regions.
14. All ﬁve countries experienced currency depreciation in this period. Theoretically, the
relationship between the size of currency depreciation and the growth rate of a subsidiary’s
employment is ambiguous. Since currency depreciation will increase a subsidiary’s optimal
employment-sales ratio, it might have a positive eﬀect on the subsidiary’s employment. On
the other hand, the size of currency depreciation indicates the seriousness of the currency
crisis and might have a negative relationship with the subsidiary’s employment.
294 Kyoji Fukao1. ASSET: Total assets of the prime Japanese parent ﬁrm, in March
1997 (billion yen).
2. PROF: The net proﬁt/total asset ratio of the prime Japanese parent
ﬁrm, in ﬁscal 1996.
3. KEI: Total number of workers employed in the host country by the
manufacturing subsidiaries whose parents belong to the same vertical
keiretsu (corporate group) as subsidiary i’s parent divided by subsidiary i’s
own employment, in March 1997; information on vertical keiretsu relation-
ships among parents were taken from Touyou Keizai Shinpou-sha (1998).
4. CAP: Capital participation rate of Japanese ﬁrms, in March 1997.
5. LOBO: Subsidiary’s long-term local borrowing from non-Japanese
banks divided by its owned capital, in March 1996. (The source of this
data is MITI 1996).
6. VALUE: Subsidiary’s value added per worker in ﬁscal 1997 (million
yen).
A subsidiary owned by a large parent ﬁrm, by a parent with higher proﬁt
rate, or by a parent with a greater keiretsu networks in the same host coun-
try is likely to get the parent ﬁrm’s or keiretsu-related subsidiaries’ support
easily, and tends to keep its employment unchanged. Japanese parents will
be more eager to support their subsidiary if their capital participation rate
is higher. Thus I expect negative coeﬃcients for ASSET, PROF, KEI,
and CAP.
According to Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (1998) and Lamberte et
al. (1999), ﬁrms with foreign ties performed better than independent local
ﬁrms in Thailand and the Philippines after the crisis. Firms with foreign
ties tend to have a higher capacity utilization level and keep employment
after the crisis. One probable reason for this diﬀerence is that ﬁrms with
foreign ties can get parent ﬁrms’ support. Another probable reason is that
ﬁrms with foreign ties tend to be less exposed to the local economy in
several aspects. First, ﬁrms with foreign ties have a higher exports/sales
ratio than independent local ﬁrms, on average (Dollar and Hallward-
Driemeier 1998) and are likely to be less hard hit by contraction of local
demand. In table 8.8, we have already seen that Japanese subsidiaries with
higher export/sales ratios performed much better than other subsidiaries.15
Second, ﬁrms with foreign ties are less connected with local banks and
local ﬁnancial markets. They tend to ﬁnance their funds from parent ﬁrms
or from banks of their home countries. In the recent Asian currency crisis,
almost all the crisis-hit countries took contracting monetary policy and
invited ﬁnancial crisis. Under such a ﬁnancial crunch, foreign subsidiaries
15. According to Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund’s (OECF’s) enterprise sur-
vey, which covers both ﬁrms with foreign ties and local independent ﬁrms, export-oriented
ﬁrms tend to keep their production after the crisis in Thailand (OECF and Japan Research
Institute of Development Assistance [RIDA] 1999).
Japanese Subsidiaries in Asia and the Regional Crisis 295less connected with local banks are likely to be able to keep their employ-
ment. I include LOBO as an explanatory variable to test this hypothesis.
It is sometimes argued that the Japanese production system depends
more on the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills. This means that Japanese
FDI is accompanied by large sunk cost. If substantial sunk costs are in-
volved, a parent ﬁrm will support its subsidiary under adversary con-
ditions. It seems that ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills play a more important role in
subsidiaries with higher value added per worker, so I expect a negative
coeﬃcient for VALUE.16
Equation (1) can be transformed into the following equation:




















Since GSAL and SIGNGSAL are endogenous variables, I estimated
equation (2) by the following two-step method. In the ﬁrst step, I estimated
a linear model for GSAL by OLS and two Tobit models for (1  SIGN-
GSAL) ∗ GSAL and CHAR ∗ (1  SIGNGSAL) ∗ GSAL. In the second
step, I estimated equation (2) by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the
predicted values of GSAL, (1  SIGNGSAL) ∗ GSAL, and (1  SIGN-
GSAL) ∗ CHAR ∗ GSAL in place of actual values of the explanatory vari-
ables.
For the linear model and the ﬁrst Tobit model for (1  SIGNGSAL) ∗
GSAL, I used the following variables as exogenous explanatory variables:
EXP, which equals [subsidiary’s exports/sales ratio in ﬁscal 1996] ∗ EXCH;
IMP, which equals [subsidiary’s imports/procurement ratio in ﬁscal 1996]
∗ EXCH; EXPE, which equals number of months of production since start
of operations as of March 1996; CAP; country dummies (the dummy for
Indonesia was omitted); and thirteen industry dummies (the dummy for
the food product industry was omitted).
Equation (1) in table 8.14 is the result of the linear model estimation for
GSAL by OLS. It is found that subsidiaries which have a higher exports/
total sales ratio and are located in a country experiencing greater currency
depreciation tended to have a higher growth rate of sales. It is conﬁrmed
that export-oriented subsidiaries were less hit by the Asian currency crisis.
It is also found that younger subsidiaries have the higher growth rate of
sales. Capital participation rate of Japanese ﬁrms has positive eﬀect on
the growth rate of sales. The coeﬃcient of the term [subsidiary’s imports/
16. I should note that there are many other factors, such as the capital-labor ratio, the
capacity utilization level, and so on that might aﬀect value added per worker, and VALUE


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5procurement ratio] ∗ EXCH was not signiﬁcant. Estimated coeﬃcients of
country dummies show that subsidiaries in the Philippines and Indonesia
performed better than those in the other three countries. After controlling
for the subsidiary’s characteristics and country-speciﬁc factors, there is no
signiﬁcant additional variation in the growth rate of sales across industries.
In equations (2)–(4), I tried several diﬀerent speciﬁcations by replacing
CAP with other characteristics of subsidiaries, such as, ASSET, PROF,
and KEI. However, the coeﬃcients of these variables were not signiﬁcant,
so I used the predicted value of GSAL by equation (1) for the second step.
For the ﬁrst Tobit model for (1  SIGNGSAL) ∗ GSAL, I used the same
explanatory variables as equation (1) of table 8.14, and for the second
Tobit model for CHAR ∗ (1  SIGNGSAL) ∗ GSAL, I used the same
explanatory variables as equation (1) of table 8.14 plus CHAR.17
Table 8.15 shows the results of the second step of estimating equation
(2) for six CHAR variables. Negative and signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcients
of ASSET and KEI imply that a subsidiary owned by a large parent ﬁrm
or owned by a parent with a greater keiretsu network in the same host
country tends to keep its employment unchanged. These ﬁndings seem to
imply that parent ﬁrms’ support is important for subsidiaries to keep their
employment. Contrary to my hypothesis, it is found that subsidiaries with
higher Japanese capital participation rate (CAP) tend to keep their em-
ployment. The coeﬃcient of PROF and LOBO were insigniﬁcant. The lat-
ter result implies that I could not conﬁrm the hypothesis that foreign sub-
sidiaries less connected with local banks are likely to be able to keep their
employment. I have also found that if a subsidiary has high value added
per worker, it will tend to keep its employment. To check the robustness
of the results, I estimated equations that include several CHAR variables
at one time (equations [12]–[14]). In these regressions, the estimated co-
eﬃcients of ASSET, KEI, and VALUE did not change substantially and
were still signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcient of CAP became insigniﬁcant.18
8.6 Conclusions
After the ﬁnancial crisis in Asia, Japanese ﬁrms increased their FDI
ﬂows to the ASEAN-4 countries and Korea mainly in order to support
Japanese Subsidiaries in Asia and the Regional Crisis 299
17. For PROF ∗ (1  SIGNGSAL) ∗ GSAL, I estimated a linear model because PROF
can take negative values.
18. I also tried reduced-form regressions of linear models directly, with change in employ-
ment as the dependent variable. Table 8.16 shows the results of these new regressions. Al-
though the simple linear models do not ﬁt the data well, the results are not inconsistent with
my other results, which are summarized in tables 8.14 and 8.15. Positive estimated coeﬃ-
cients of EXP imply that subsidiaries which have higher exports-total sales ratios and are
located in countries that experienced greater currency depreciation tend to have higher
growth rates of employment. Positive and signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcients of KEI and
VALUE imply that subsidiaries which are owned by a parent with a greater keiretu network







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.their troubled subsidiaries. The number of new FDI cases (including ac-
quisitions), however, declined substantially. Expansions of existing sub-
sidiaries were also very rare. In Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, export-
oriented subsidiaries, which are deﬁned as subsidiaries with exports/sales
ratios greater than 50 percent, increased their sales by 17 percent and
almost doubled their proﬁts; but they expanded their average employment
by less than 1 percent. Although new investments and capacity expansions
were rare, Japanese subsidiaries persevered in maintaining employment
levels. The persistence of Japanese companies is shown by the fact that
even local market–oriented subsidiaries barely reduced employment levels
despite sharp declines in sales and proﬁts. Parent ﬁrms supported their
aﬃliates by raising their paid-up capital and helped their local market–
oriented subsidiaries, such as those in the transport equipment industry,
boost their exports substantially.19 It seems that the prime cause of Japa-
19. Japanese parent ﬁrms also took several other measures to support their subsidiaries in
the region. Toyota expanded its project to invite workers of developing countries to Japan
for on-the-job training after the crisis. In order to keep skilled workers of subsidiaries in
ASEAN countries, Toyota doubled the number of invited workers from the region to about
500 in ﬁscal 1998. This project was supported by the Association for Overseas Technical
Scholarship (AOTS), whose activity is partly ﬁnanced by the Japanese government. Ac-
cording to a personal interview, several parent ﬁrms transferred their proﬁt to their subsidiar-
ies in the region by transfer pricing.
Table 8.16 Determinants of the Growth Rate of Subsidiary’s Employment
Eq. 15 Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 18 Eq. 19
EXP 0.104 0.116 0.134 0.124 0.088
(1.688)* (1.632) (1.895)* (1.755)* (1.180)
EXCH 0.161 0.221 0.216 0.161 0.209









N 743 496 503 626 599
F-value 0.59 0.63 1.14 0.79 0.49
Prob 	 F 0.886 0.859 0.311 0.697 0.955
Adjusted R2 0.0084 0.0120 0.0046 0.0054 0.0140
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients of industry dummies and constant terms are omitted. N  number of ob-
servations.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Japanese Subsidiaries in Asia and the Regional Crisis 301nese subsidiaries’ export increase is not production expansion by export-
oriented subsidiaries but the struggle for survival by previously local
market–oriented subsidiaries.
Since Japanese subsidiaries seem to be characterized not by nimbleness
but by perseverance, I studied what type of subsidiaries were reluctant to
cut their workforces even when their sales were declining. Using econo-
metric analysis on subsidiary-level data, I found that a subsidiary’s elastic-
ity of employment to a negative change of sales depends upon several
characteristics of the subsidiary. I found that a subsidiary owned by a large
p a r e n tﬁ r mo ro w n e db yap a r e n tw i t hag r e a t e rkeiretsu network in the
same host country tends to maintain its employment levels. This ﬁnding
seems to imply that parent ﬁrms’ support is important for subsidiaries to
maintain their employment levels. I also found that if a subsidiary has a
high value added per worker, it will tend to keep its employment level.
Probably, Japanese parent ﬁrms cannot exploit host countries’ currency
crisis and the “ﬁre sale” of local ﬁrms in part because they themselves
are in trouble due to the deep recession in Japan. In order to explain the
perseverance of Japanese parent ﬁrms, we need another hypothesis. One
possible explanation is that they are patient because of sunk costs. It is
sometimes argued that the Japanese production system depends more on
long-term supplier relationships and the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills. This means that Japanese FDI is accompanied by large sunk costs.
If substantial sunk costs are involved, a parent ﬁrm will support its subsid-
iary under adverse conditions. Long-term commitments inevitably incur
larger losses when investments fail. The emphasis on long-term relation-
ships is thought to have made Japanese ﬁrms sensitive to risk and wary of
making new investments, including corporate acquisitions. Unfortunately,
my data set covers too short a period, and statistics on U.S. subsidiaries’
activities for 1998 are not yet available. By expanding the time span of my
analysisandbycomparingJapanesesubsidiaries’responsewiththatofU.S.
subsidiaries, we may be able to obtain more rigorous results in the future.
What lessons can be learned from these recent experiences? First it was
conﬁrmed that direct investment is a much more reliable form of capital
movement than quick-at-ﬂight portfolio investment and international
bank loans in an economic crisis.20 Second, optimistic expectations that
weak currencies of the host countries would naturally bring about an in-
crease in direct investment have proved to be mistaken. To be able to re-
turn to the desirable conditions before the Asian economic crisis, where
direct investment was the nucleus around which the intraregional division
of labor developed and economic growth continued, Japan and other for-
eign governments would need to support direct investment actively.
20. Analysis by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD
1999) also conﬁrms this fact.
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Comment Mario B. Lamberte
Let me start by saying that I learned a lot from this paper. Indeed, there
are very few studies that have analyzed the eﬀects of the regional ﬁnancial
Mario B. Lamberte is president of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies
(PIDS).
304 Kyoji Fukaocrisis on ﬁrms and their responses to such crisis using microlevel data; one
of these is Dr. Fukao’s paper. I would like to comment on a few points of
his paper to help me better understand his results.
BoP Data versus Microeconomic Level
The paper has pointed out that Japan’s FDI ﬂows (on the basis of BoP
statistics) to the Asian region increased after the crisis. The reason put
forward on page 277 is that “Japanese ﬁrms increased their FDI ﬂows to
the Asian countries mainly in order to ﬁnancially assist their subsidiaries
that were suﬀering from deteriorating ﬁnancial conditions.” The FDI ﬂows
were not meant for merger and acquisition (M&A) purchases or for
“greenﬁeld investment.” This explanation seems to be inconsistent with
ﬁrm-level data. On page 275, the study points out that “according to MITI
(1999b), Japan’s manufacturing subsidiaries in the ASEAN-4 countries
have reduced their investments in tangible ﬁxed assets (excluding land) by
54 percent from the third quarter of 1997 to the third quarter of 1998.
Even subsidiaries in the electrical machinery industry, which are the most
export oriented and the least hit by the crisis, reduced their investment by
25 percent during this period.”
Diﬀerences in Behavior between Japanese and U.S./European Firms
The paper has noted that, “Compared with U.S. and European ﬁrms,
[Japanese ﬁrms] made quite limited amounts of cross-border M&A pur-
chases [in the ASEAN-4 countries and Korea]” (277). It could be that
Japanese ﬁrms are not seizing the investment opportunities available in
Asian countries during the ﬁnancial turmoil. However, one must ask the
question: Who is buying ﬁrms in Asia? In the case of U.S. and German
ﬁrms, investment banks and companies could have been acquiring ﬁrms
in Asia with the intention of unloading them later when their value returns
to their precrisis level. In the case of Japanese ﬁrms, these may not be
investment banks and companies, which I think are currently having ﬁ-
nancial diﬃculties with many of their investments turning sour, but manu-
facturing ﬁrms looking for strategic, long-term investment in the Asian
region.
Excluding the Philippines
I am a bit disappointed to read that in the detailed microlevel portion
of the paper the Philippines was excluded from the analysis because of
being the least adversely aﬀected by the it. The analysis could have been
enriched had the Philippines been included, because the results could per-
haps tell us how Japanese subsidiaries in the least adversely aﬀected coun-
tries behaved diﬀerently from those hardest hit by the crisis.
The following ﬁgures reﬂect some of our recent ﬁndings using the latest
ﬁrm-level survey data conducted by the National Statistics Oﬃce (NSO)
with support from the World Bank. Figure 8C.1 shows that there was a
Japanese Subsidiaries in Asia and the Regional Crisis 305higher proportion of domestically owned ﬁrms admitting that they had
fewer workers in the wake of the regional crisis than of foreign-owned
ﬁrms doing so. Figure 8C.2 shows that while the average capacity utiliza-
tion of wholly domestically owned ﬁrms dropped signiﬁcantly during the
period 1996 to the ﬁrst half of 1998, that of foreign-owned ﬁrms had
hardly changed at all.
Switching from Local Sales to Exports
The paper found that subsidiaries owned by larger parents were hit
harder by the crisis and that they “expanded their exports to Japan greatly.
Probably, with the help of their large parent ﬁrm this type of subsidi-
ary was able to switch from local sales to exports” (290–94). Is this a
temporary measure adopted by parent ﬁrms, which are expecting the host
countries’ market to improve a few months down the line? Did parent
companies do something quickly to their subsidiaries to make them in-
ternationally competitive? Or were the subsidiaries already internation-
ally competitive, but were simply paying more attention to the domestic
market due to huge demand for their products before the onset of the
crisis?
Econometric Analysis
In the econometric model, the dependent variable is GEMP, which is
the growth of employment from March 1997 to March 1998. During the
crisis period, the laying oﬀ of workers was only one of the responses of
ﬁrms. There were other measures, such as cutting down on work hours or
the workweek, forced vacation, and so on. In the Philippines, foreign-
owned ﬁrms took advantage of these measures (see table 8C.1).
The net proﬁt–total asset ratio of the prime Japanese parent ﬁrm in
306 Kyoji Fukao

































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ﬁscal year 1996 was used as one of the independent variables in one of the
regression runs. Was this based on a consolidated ﬁnancial statement or
did it exclude the contribution of the subsidiaries? These diﬀerent measure-
ments could have diﬀerent impacts on the dependent variable.
By estimating equations using diﬀerent representations of the variable
CHAR, the variable in question could have picked up the eﬀects of other
variables. Why not estimate an equation using all the variables represent-
ing CHAR, except ASSET, which could be highly correlated with PROF
or CAP?
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Comment Assaf Razin
An important aspect of FDI is that it is proven to be resilient during ﬁ-
nancial crises, in situations of international illiquidity, when the country’s
consolidated ﬁnancial system has short-term obligations in foreign cur-
rency in excess of the amount of foreign currency to which the country has
access on short notice. In this context, FDI ﬂows provide the only direct
link between the domestic capital market in the host country and the world
capital market at large. Indeed, FDI ﬂows to the East Asian countries were
remarkably stable during the global ﬁnancial crises of 1997–98. In sharp
contrast, portfolio equity and debt ﬂows, as well as bank loans, dried up
almost completely during the same period. The resilience of FDI to ﬁnan-
cial crisis was also evident in the Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Latin
American debt crisis of the early 1980s. This may reﬂect a unique charac-
teristic of FDI, which is determined by considerations of ownership and
control by multinationals of domestic activities, which are more long term
in nature, rather than by short-term ﬂuctuations in the value of domestic
currency and the availability of credit and liquidity.
Kyoji Fukao has access to a unique data set that can shed light on the
resiliency of FDI. He sets himself up to deal with one empirical hypothe-
sis: Due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills and sunk (human and physical capital) in-
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a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.vestment costs, employment will not drop as much as sales during the
crisis.
Method and Findings
In the typical regression, the dependent variable is employment growth
and the explanatory variables are (a) sales growth (interacting with busi-
ness activity upswing and downswing dummies); (b) parent’s ﬁrm charac-
teristics; and (c) subsidiary ﬁrm’s characteristics.
The hypothesis implies the existence of a kink in the employment-sales
growth equation. When employment growth is positive, employment re-
sponds linearly to sales growth, while the employment response to negative
sales growth is inelastic. Since the upswing (downswing) dummy is poten-
tially endogenous, the estimation is carried out in two stages. In the ﬁrst
stage a Tobit model is implemented to estimate interactions between the
dummy variable and sales growth. The second stage uses the predicted val-
ues of this interaction term in the employment-sales growth equation.
The author ﬁnds that the evidence supports a kink-shaped schedule for
employment growth and sales growth. He also ﬁnds that the characteris-
tics of the parent ﬁrm, such as parent ﬁrm proﬁts and its ownership share
in the subsidiaries (which are related to the incentive of parent ﬁrms to
support employment in subsidiaries during crisis), are signiﬁcant statisti-
cally in the regressions. He also ﬁnds that evidence that new subsidiaries
and high-productivity subsidiaries tend to keep employment more than
old and low-productivity subsidiaries, in line with the hypothesis.
Critique
My critique is threefold:
1. A key element of the crisis, the huge depreciation of the real ex-
change rate, is totally ignored. For example, the author does not diﬀeren-
tiate between export-oriented and domestic-market-oriented ﬁrms, con-
cerning their diﬀerent behavior when the real exchange rate is stable versus
when it is sharply depreciated.
2. Investmentdataareignored.Aplausiblerelatedhypothesisthatcould
have been tested, if investment data were available, concerns the response
of the ratio of human to physical capital to real depreciations. When the
real exchange rate depreciates and human capital becomes relatively cheap
compared to physical capital, there will be a substitution eﬀect away from
physical capital, which can help explain the ﬁnding of stable employment
during the business downswing.
3. Evidently, the employment-sales relationship is a dynamic concept,
but the author pursues only contemporaneous relationships between the
variables. A longer time series and a dynamic analytical framework of
the response of employment to sales is warranted in order to understand
the nature of the eﬀect of crises on the employment-sales relationship.
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